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Whatever his substantive accomplishments, the late William 
Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice of the United States reinforced 
that office’s distinctive character.  Prone to admonish advocates who 
addressed him merely as “Justice” Rehnquist,1 he designed spiffy new 
robes for himself—inspired, apparently, by the character of the Lord 
Chancellor in Iolanthe2—that were on display during the impeach-
ment trial of President Clinton.  This reflected, however idiosyncrati-
cally, a widely shared understanding of the importance of the office 
and the glory of holding it.  Life tenure is a key part of its appeal.  Wil-
liam Howard Taft famously preferred being Chief Justice to being 
President,3 and John Quincy Adams noted that while “the power of 
constructing the law is almost equivalent to the power of enacting 
it[, t]he office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is held for life, 
that of the President of the United States only for four, or at most for 
eight, years.”4
† Associate Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School, and Associate Profes-
sor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 Tony Mauro, Rehnquist Is the Chief, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 3, 1990, at 15 (noting that 
when an advocate addressed Rehnquist as “Justice Rehnquist” for a second time, 
“Rehnquist leaned forward to interrupt and, shaking his finger, reminded [him], ‘I am 
the chief justice.’”).  Rehnquist reportedly went so far as to write a letter to the Court 
clerk, suggesting that lawyers be cautioned against that particular mistake.  See Morning 
Edition:  Relationship Among Supreme Court Justices, as Reflected in Justice Harry Blackmun’s 
Notes (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 5, 2004) (describing the contents of Justice Black-
mun’s files, which included a copy of this letter). 
2 Richard Lacayo & Viveca Novak, How Rehnquist Changed America, TIME, June 30, 
2003, at 20, 24. 
3 Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States:  Primus Inter Pares, 17 
J. PUB. L. 20, 24 (1968) [hereinafter Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States]; Al-
pheus Thomas Mason, President by Chance, Chief Justice by Choice, 55 A.B.A. J. 35, 35 
(1969); see also Jeffrey B. Morris, What Heaven Must Be Like:  William Howard Taft as Chief 
Justice, 1921-30, 1983 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 80, 80. 
4 9 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 251 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadel-
phia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876).  Perhaps revealingly, Adams later declined a nomi-
nation to become a (mere) Associate Justice, protesting that he was “conscious of too 
little law.”  Merlo J. Pusey, Court Nominations and Presidential Cronyism, 1981 Y.B. SUP. 
CT. HIST. SOC’Y 68, 69. 
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The means by which Chief Justice Rehnquist’s term began and 
ended also evidenced the singular nature of the job.  His promotion 
to succeed Warren Burger was hard fought, but it also diverted atten-
tion from the nearly simultaneous appointment of Antonin Scalia, 
who was nominated to assume Rehnquist’s just-vacated seat as Associ-
ate Justice—and who might otherwise have attracted closer scrutiny.  
Rehnquist’s death this past summer also illustrated the peculiar char-
acter of promotion.  John Roberts had already been nominated to 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s seat as Associate Justice, but the nomination 
was withdrawn so that he could be renominated instead to succeed 
Rehnquist.  This reinforced the disjunction between the two positions, 
and suggested that prior appointment to the Court would no more 
have resolved the question of appointment as Chief Justice than would 
prior appointment as White House Counsel. 
Is this etched in stone?  Rehnquist’s robes, at once innovative and 
a throwback, hinted not.  Gilbert and Sullivan’s Lord Chancellor, who 
claimed to “embody the Law,” inhabited an office that American 
Chief Justices have regarded enviously.5  But the Lord Chancellor’s 
powers have waxed and waned over time, and the House of Lords only 
recently thwarted a proposal to abolish the office entirely.6  Tradition-
ally, it was even possible for others—including a commoner or a 
committee—to be assigned some of the Lord Chancellor’s duties in-
stead.7
Just so for the office of the Chief Justice, where the appointment 
process is also a matter of tradition not immune from reconsideration.  
Although the office has always been treated as a separate lifetime ap-
pointment, subject to Senate confirmation, that does not seem to be 
required by the Constitution, and Congress might change things alto-
5 See Peter G. Fish, The Office of Chief Justice of the United States:  Into the Federal Judici-
ary’s Bicentennial Decade, in THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1, 16-17 (1984) (citing 
remarks by William Howard Taft and Warren E. Burger).  Others, though, have ex-
pressly rejected the Lord Chancellor as a model, and have criticized what they per-
ceived as a growing resemblance.  See Phillip B. Kurland, The Lord Chancellor of the 
United States, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 11, 11, 28 (noting the administrative character 
of the lord chancellorship in Britain and arguing that such duties should not be the 
task of the American Chief Justice). 
6 Patrick Wintour, Peers Vote Against Plans to Abolish Lord Chancellor’s Traditional 
Role, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 16, 2005, at 8. 
7 Technically, potential assignees include the Lord Keeper and the Lord Commis-
sioners of the Great Seal, respectively.  EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 213-14 (2d ed. 1920); see also Note, The Lord High Chancellor and the Great Seal, 27 
HARV. L. REV. 70, 70 (1913) (noting that the Lord High Chancellor had entrusted the 
Seal to three appointed commissioners). 
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gether.  Picking Chief Justice Roberts’s successor in a different way—
from among the Justices, by seniority, or by vote of the Justices them-
selves, and to serve for a limited term—might be a modest step toward 
improving the Court’s legitimacy.  At the very least, a better under-
standing of the latitude in the appointment process may prompt a 
clearer evaluation of the present system’s costs and benefits. 
I.  THE OFFICE AND ITS POWERS 
The U.S. Constitution only indirectly adverts to a Chief Justice.  
Article III provides simply that there will be “one supreme Court” and 
various “Judges” to populate both it and the lower courts.8  Article I, 
however, mentions the Chief Justice as the person presiding when the 
Senate is trying a case of impeachment against the President.9  That’s 
it.  Section 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 elaborated that “the supreme 
court of the United States shall consist of a chief justice and five asso-
ciate justices.”10  One member of the House objected that the title 
“Chief Justice” was “a concomitant of royalty,” but retreated when a 
colleague pointed out that the term was already employed in the Con-
stitution.11
The title—and the position—has since transcended its constitu-
tional roots.  By tradition, the Chief Justice presides over the Court’s 
public proceedings, chairs the Justices’ conferences, and assigns opin-
ions in those cases in which she is in the majority.  The Chief Justice 
also oversees the Court’s administration and lobbies on the Court’s 
behalf on matters involving its docket and jurisdiction.12
But the position has also evolved to take on responsibilities be-
yond the Court.  While the first Chief Justices were each commis-
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
9 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
10 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73. 
11 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783 ( Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording the remarks of 
Representatives Burke and Benson during the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
12 See ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE:  LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 
159-213 (1986) (chronicling the Chief Justice’s role in leading the judiciary outside the 
courtroom, with emphasis on the political nature of the job); Fish, supra note 5,  
at 37-74 (recounting both the internal administrative duties and external representa-
tive duties of the Chief Justice); Peter G. Fish, Office of the Chief Justice, in THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 140, 140-41 (Kermit L. 
Hall et al. eds., 1992) (summarizing the Chief Justice’s role as “public advocate[] and 
defender[] of the Court” to both the national government and the public); Felix 
Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 903-04 (1953) (discussing 
the importance of the Chief’s duty to assign authorship of Court opinions). 
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sioned as “Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,”13 
Presidents and Chief Justices began to use broader terms like “Lord 
Chief Justice”14 and “Chief Justice of the Union,”15 and Congress even-
tually endorsed their use of “Chief Justice of the United States.”16  The 
position’s national responsibilities grew apace.  At Chief Justice Taft’s 
urging, Congress created the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
chaired by the Chief Justice,17 and later created the subordinate Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts.18  The Chief Justice 
has also been made responsible for assigning sitting and retired 
judges to serve assignments outside of their normal jurisdictions19—
which Chief Justice Taft allegedly used to direct judges favoring Pro-
hibition toward “wet” judicial districts, and Chief Justice Burger alleg-
edly used to tilt the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court20—and 
the office has gradually accrued statutory, legislative, and public rela-
tions functions. 
The growth in the Chief Justice’s powers has been controversial.  
The position’s increasingly diverse responsibilities may, for example, 
distract from judging, raise accountability problems owing to life ten-
ure, or endanger the Court’s perceived independence from politics.21  
13 John M. Daniel, III, “Chief Justice of the United States:”  History and Historiography of 
the Title, 1983 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 109, 109-10. 
14 STEAMER, supra note 12, at 5. 
15 Fish, supra note 5, at 9. 
16 Daniel, supra note 13, at 111.  Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase was a particularly 
ardent lobbyist for a broader mandate, at the same time urging a reduction in the 
number of Justices so as to increase the salaries for those remaining.  Id.  In his view, 
reportedly, “the Chief Justice was separate and distinct from the court, that, as he 
stated it, ‘the court was built up around the Chief Justice.’”  William A. Richardson, 
Chief Justice of the United States, or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States?, 49 
NEW ENG. HIST. & GENEOLOGICAL REG. 275, 278 (1895). 
17 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000). 
18 Id. § 601. 
19 See id. §§ 291-297 (allowing temporary assignment of circuit judges, district 
court judges, judges of the Court of International Trade, and retired Justices or 
judges). 
20 Fish, supra note 12, at 141.  Taft himself had urged far greater authority for the 
Chief Justice, including the power to assign new judges on a permanent basis.  Judith 
Resnik, Constricting Remedies:  The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. 
L.J. 223, 276 n.285 (2003).  For a terrific analysis of the history and constitutionality of 
the Chief Justice’s appointment powers, including how it has been exercised in prac-
tice, see Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 341 (2004). 
21 See Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. 
REV. 1031, 1041-45 (1979) (discussing the problems created by the present administra-
tive structure). 
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These missions also raise accountability concerns:  government offi-
cials often accrete powers for their offices, but mission creep is surely 
more troubling when the powers vest in someone with lifetime tenure. 
The point for immediate purposes, however, is that Congress 
could radically alter this situation.  Changing the Chief Justice’s role 
in presidential impeachment would seem to require constitutional 
amendment,22 but nothing else rises to that level.  The non-
adjudicative functions are of relatively recent vintage, and, if anything, 
are weakly contraindicated by the Framers’ failure to adopt proposals 
that would have involved the Chief Justice in the legislative process.23  
The Chief Justice’s responsibilities within the Court may seem wor-
thier of constitutional protection, but the Constitution, recall, only 
mentions the Chief Justice in connection with the Senate, and has left 
Congress (and, at least in its absence, the Court) free to resolve the 
Chief Justice’s more routine adjudicative role.  There seems to be 
nothing that would prevent the other Justices, acting individually or 
collectively, from running the show—a point to bear in mind as we 
turn to the appointment process. 
II.  APPOINTING THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Had the Chief Justice’s modern responsibilities been anticipated 
at the nation’s founding, they might have provoked greater delibera-
tion about the appointment process.  The records of the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution are silent as to what the founding gen-
eration contemplated.  To be sure, chief judges were scarcely foreign 
to them.  Colonial and state judiciaries provided them with a wealth of 
experience—for example, half of the first Supreme Court had held an 
22 Although, that role has been expanded and contracted without such an amend-
ment.  The Senate rules provide that the Chief Justice shall also take responsibility for 
presiding over the impeachment of a Vice President serving as acting President.  S. 
COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, OR-
DERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEN-
ATE, S. DOC. NO. 104-1, at rule 103 (1995).  On the other hand, Congress by statute 
provided for an alternative to the Chief Justice.  See 28 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (empowering 
an Associate Justice to assume the duties of a Chief Justice who becomes disabled); see 
also infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the potential conflict between the 
statute and the Constitution). 
23 But cf. Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. 
CT. REV. 123, 127-30 (arguing that the failure of proposals for a Council of Revision 
and a Council of State is not inconsistent with an expectation that that the Justices 
would perform some extrajudicial tasks). 
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analogous office on their states’ highest courts24—but it may be 
doubted whether these variegated schemes cohered or were mastered 
by any one of the Framers,25 and whether they saw much likeness to 
the Supreme Court they were creating.26
Three themes might have been apparent.  One was that the chief 
justice was widely treated as a separate appointment, hierarchically 
superior to others of the same tribunal.27  Second, the chief justice’s 
role was often substantively and procedurally dissimilar to any that 
might have been contemplated in the U.S. Constitution—for exam-
ple, because he participated in legislative councils, or served in more 
than one office at a time.28  Third, colonial and state courts and their 
24 The Fourth Provincial Congress of New York had elected John Jay to be chief 
justice of New York’s Supreme Court of Judicature in 1777.  1 The DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 5 (Maeva Marcus 
& James R. Perry eds., 1985).  William Cushing served twelve years on Massachusetts’ 
highest court, first as an associate justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court of Judi-
cature, then as its chief justice, then as chief justice of the successor Supreme Judicial 
Court.  Id. at 26.  John Rutledge was chief judge of South Carolina’s first court of 
chancery.  GEORGE J. LANKEVICH, THE FEDERAL COURT, 1787-1801, at 239 (1986). 
25 The possibility that they did not cohere was noted by Max Farrand, in com-
ments on Hamilton’s proposal.  See 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 618-19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (noting the possibility that Convention participants 
may not have felt “perfectly acquainted with the judicial systems of all the States, and 
therefore could not in advance of discussion decide what phrase should be used to 
cover the case of States which did not precisely have a chief judge” for purposes of 
fleshing out a proposal for trying impeachments). 
26 See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:  
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 27, 35-37, 41-44 
(Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990) (contrasting the court system established by the 
Constitution with its contemporaries). 
27 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 4-5 (noting evidence of a perceived distinc-
tion between the roles of Chief Justice and Associate Justice). 
28 In 1779, for example, John Blair, Jr., became chief justice of the Virginia Gen-
eral Court, served as an ex officio member of the first Court of Appeals of Virginia as of 
its creation that year, and was elected as one of the three chancellors of the High 
Court of Chancery.  He was elected a member of a supplemental committee of legisla-
tive revisors in 1786, and elected a member of the new Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia in 1789, sometimes holding more than one judicial post at a time, while also 
serving as a representative to the constitutional convention and to Virginia’s ratifying 
convention.  J. Elliot Drinard, John Blair, Jr., in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH 
ANNUAL MEETING:  THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 436, 439-42 (C.M. Chiches-
ter ed., 1927).  The powers of the General Court relative to the High Court of Chan-
cery, to the several courts of appeal, and to the courts of trial jurisdiction—not to men-
tion to the legislature—fluctuated considerably.  See R.G.H. Kean, Our Judicial System:  
Some of Its History, and Some of Its Defects, in REPORT OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF 
THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 139, 142-43 (Richmond, Va., Everett Waddey 
1889); Francis H. McGuire, The General Court of Virginia, in REPORT OF THE SEVENTH 
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judges were generally subject to political control—only the number of 
judges, means of initial appointment, and tenure were fixed by state 
constitutions29—and details like the appointment of chief justices were 
often left unresolved.30  The Constitution, likewise, guaranteed judges’ 
tenure during “good Behaviour” and prevented reductions in salary,31 
but without inhibiting Congress from changing the Court’s work or 
the number of Justices. 
Neither the colonies nor the states had many chances to address 
how anyone comparable to an Associate Justice might be promoted to 
become chief justice,32 and the initial experience under the Constitu-
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 197, 202-15 (Richmond, 
Va., The Williams Printing Co. 1895). 
29 See Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution:  English and 
American Precedents, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 138-47 (describing the treatment of the 
judiciary in early state constitutions. 
30 In Virginia, for example, the state constitution of 1776 stated only that the Su-
preme Court of Appeals should consist of “judges,” and the practice evolved of select-
ing as president the judge with the longest period of continuous service.  2 A.E. DICK 
HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 727 (1974).  Like Vir-
ginia, some of the other state constitutions establishing supreme courts or their equiva-
lents did not specify the existence of a chief justice. See MD. CONST. of 1776, arts. 
XLVIII, LVI; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XII; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. III, XXV, XXXII; 
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII; PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 20, 23.  Other State Constitu-
tions mentioned the office, but did so without specifying the means of the Chief Jus-
tice’s selection.  See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XL.  To be sure, a number of state 
statutes did address the establishment and composition of supreme courts, including 
an office of chief justice.  See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 92-103 
(1940) (describing the relevant state constitutions and statutes prior to 1789).  Some 
states even specified how the chief justice was to be selected, without providing much 
detail.  See, e.g., DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 12.  But no state appears to have immunized 
the appointment process from legislative change. 
31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
32 John Blair, Jr., as previously noted, had ascended to become the chief justice for 
the Virginia General Court.  Under a Virginia law enacted in 1777, judges were to 
“have precedence in court as they may stand in nomination on the [legislative] ballot, 
and the person first named shall be called Chief Justice of such court,” McGuire, supra 
note 28, at 203, but the law did not specify how to handle vacancies.  After Blair’s pre-
cedessor as chief justice, Joseph Jones, resigned in 1779, Blair appears to have become 
chief justice—in practice, if not necessarily through formal commission—due to his 
position as the senior-most, second-named judge.  See William Brockenrough, Brief 
Sketch of the Courts of this Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) at v, x (1826) (charting the 
initial appointments to the court and noting the resignation of Joseph Jones); Record 
of Proceedings of March 2, 1778, in 2 JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF 
VIRGINIA 95 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., 1932) (recording the initial appointments to the 
Virginia General Court); Email from E. Lee Shepard, Director of Manuscripts and Ar-
chives, Va. Historical Soc’y, to Edward Swaine, Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School ( June 6, 2005) (on file with author) (noting that Blair took 
over as the presiding officer following the resignation of Jones).  William Cushing, who 
replaced John Adams as chief justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court of Judica-
  
1716 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1709 
 
tion was a blur.33  When President Washington appointed the first 
slate of Justices, he simply had to designate one, John Jay, as the Chief 
Justice.34  When Jay resigned to assume the governorship of New York, 
Washington faced the first test of how to replace a Chief Justice.  It was 
a debacle.  He first selected former Justice John Rutledge, who had 
left previously to become a state court judge.  Rutledge served briefly 
with a recess appointment before being rejected by the Senate follow-
ing a vituperative political speech (against, of all things, the Jay 
Treaty) that gave rise to rumors that he was mentally unstable.35  
Washington then delayed nominating a replacement in order to 
gauge the interest of Patrick Henry, who failed to provide the Presi-
dent with a timely response.36  With just weeks before the next sitting, 
and having lacked a properly confirmed, sitting Chief Justice for 
nearly two years, Washington nominated then-Associate Justice Wil-
liam Cushing.37  The Senate confirmed Cushing the next day, but he 
resigned his commission one week afterward, on health and age 
grounds, after serving as Chief Justice for perhaps one dinner party.  
Washington finally succeeded with Senator Oliver Ellsworth, though 
he served only three years as Chief Justice.38
Washington’s travails provide only a fleeting and imperfect illus-
tration of how a sitting Justice could be promoted, though some in-
volved tendered their views as to how succession should be managed.  
Attorney General Bradford opined that the “principle of Rotation 
ture, had been senior associate justice beforehand—and acted as chief justice in Ad-
ams’ absence, the latter never having served his appointment.  Arthur P. Rugg, William 
Cushing, 30 YALE L.J. 128, 131 (1920). 
33 Prior national experience, needless to say, was not extensive.  One example, 
however, was the Continental Congress’s Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, the 
presidency of which was apparently selected by lot.  1 HAMPTON L. CARSON, THE HIS-
TORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (1902). 
34 See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 33-36 
(1922).  Even at this early stage, the role of Chief Justice was viewed as distinct from 
that of the other Justices.  John Rutledge, who had left a position as an Associate Jus-
tice of the United States Supreme Court to take a position as chief justice of the South 
Carolina Court of Common Pleas, later lobbied Washington for the chance to succeed 
Jay, and his correspondence makes clear that the position as Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court was the most prestigious of the three.  Id. at 127-28 (quoting Letter from 
John Rutledge to President George Washington (June 12, 1795)); see also JOHN AN-
THONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 24-25 (1995) (noting 
newspaper editorials lobbying for and against candidates to be the first Chief Justice). 
35 James R. Perry, Supreme Court Appointments, 1789-1801:  Criteria, Presidential Style, 
and the Press of Events, 6 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 371, 385-90 (1986). 
36 Id. at 393-94. 
37 Id. at 394. 
38 Id. at 396-97. 
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would be the least exceptionable,” because it reduced the judiciary’s 
dependence on the President, but added that the prospect of an in-
appropriate senior-most Associate Justice—he adverted specifically to 
Justice Cushing—made such a system untenable.39  The Associate Jus-
tices, for their part, seemed to expect that one of their number would 
become Chief; Thomas Jefferson, writing before Cushing’s selection, 
speculated that the initial Rutledge nomination “seems to have been 
intended merely to establish a precedent against the descent of that 
office by seniority, and to keep five mouths always gaping for one 
sugar plumb.”40  Following the appointment of Cushing, one Federal-
ist worried “that the promotion . . . will form a precedent for making 
Chief Justices from the eldest Judge, tho’ other candidates may be 
much better qualified.”41
Afterward, a practice developed that no Associate Justice should be 
promoted to Chief Justice.  Lincoln and Grant reportedly turned 
against internal candidates on principle,42 and President Cleveland se-
riously offended Justice Stephen J. Field by looking outside the Court 
to select Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller.43  President Taft, trying to 
entice Charles Evans Hughes into becoming Associate Justice, con-
fided that he did not “regard the practice of never promoting associ-
39 Letter from William Bradford, Jr., to Samuel Bayard ( June 4, 1795), in 1 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, 
supra note 24, at 755.  Cf. Letter from Tench Coxe to Richard Henry Lee (Apr. 11, 
1792), in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 24, at 735 (noting personal conviction that the office of 
the Chief Justice, and those of the cabinet secretaries, “should be put on such a footing 
that when vacant they should be unclog’d by the pretensions of any subordinate officer 
whatever,” preferring the “man of first abilities,” so that “dull seniority and length of 
service should be considered as nothing”). 
40 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Mar. 2, 1796), in THE DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra 
note 24, at 841; see also WARREN, supra note 34, at 128-29 (providing the context of Jef-
ferson’s statement). 
41 Letter from William Plumer to Jeremiah Smith (Feb. 19, 1796), in 1 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, 
supra note 24, at 838; see also WARREN, supra note 34, at 139-40 (providing the context 
of Plumer’s statement). 
42 Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States, supra note 3, at 51-52.  The evidence 
as to the latter, at least, seems weak; Lincoln appears to have made his selection as a 
matter of political pragmatism, after giving serious consideration to Justice Swayne.  See 
DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT 197-202 (1956) (discussing the political 
pressures on Lincoln to nominate Salmon P. Chase). 
43 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 
17 (1995); CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD:  CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 319 (Ar-
chon Books 1963) (1930). 
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ate justices as one to be followed” (without, he added in a postscript, 
promising Hughes the promotion outright).44  Taft did not in fact 
promote Justice Hughes, and rejected the aspirations of senior Associ-
ate Justice John Marshall Harlan, exclaiming that “I won’t make the 
position of chief justice a blue ribbon for the final years of any mem-
ber of the court.”45  But Taft did ultimately break tradition by promot-
ing sitting Associate Justice Edward Douglas White.  Then-Associate 
Justice Stone was promoted subsequently (immediately following 
Chief Justice Hughes, who had been nominated after a period away 
from the Court), as was Justice Rehnquist.  All told—but excluding 
Justice Cushing—three of the sixteen Chief Justices who have served 
to date have been promoted from within the Court, all of them during 
this century. 
III.  CHANGING THE CHIEF 
At present, then, a sitting Justice may neither count on nor ex-
clude the possibility of promotion.  This is arguably meritocratic, but 
the resulting uncertainty may be the worst of both worlds.  The rea-
sons for maintaining the promotion option are probably self-evident.  
Experience on the Court (to a point) may be helpful in leading it.  
That is the premise, presumably, of making the senior Associate Jus-
tice the Court’s second-in-command,46 and the basis for some criti-
cisms of inexperienced outsiders becoming Chief Justice.47  There are 
also incentive effects to consider.  Reducing the odds that able Associ-
ate Justices may be considered for Chief Justice may make it harder to 
retain them; it is human nature to grow dissatisfied when those less 
experienced are brought in at a higher position, at least where later 
advancement seems foreclosed.  In theory, it may even make it harder 
44 Daniel S. McHargue, President Taft’s Appointments to the Supreme Court, 12 J. POL. 
478, 488-89 (1950). 
45 Id. at 492. 
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (authorizing the senior Associate Justice to assume the 
Chief Justice’s powers when the Chief Justice is incapacitated or the office is vacant).  
The succession is also traditional in character.  See Sandra L. Wood, In the Shadow of the 
Chief:  The Role of the Senior Associate Justice, J. SUP. CT. HIST., July 1997, at 25, 26-29 (not-
ing the various instances in which the senior Associate Justice has presided over the 
Court). 
47 See, e.g., 1 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 278 (1951) (citing criticisms 
of the inexperience of Chief Justices Waite and Fuller).  One may view the same cases 
differently, of course, see Jeffrey B. Morris, Chief Justice Edward Douglass White and Presi-
dent Taft’s Court, 1982 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 27, 39 (describing Waite and Fuller as 
comparatively more successful Chief Justices than Edward Douglass White), and there 
are certainly inexperienced but accomplished Chief Justices, such as Earl Warren. 
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to recruit Associate Justices in the first place—witness Taft’s felt need 
to reassure Hughes in recruiting him to the Associate ranks48—though 
it is unlikely to be too dissuasive. 
On the other hand, the prospect of promotion may make sitting 
Justices solicit political favor—something that led former Justice Owen 
Roberts, later Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, to 
urge that Associate Justices ought never be considered for Chief Jus-
tice.49  The specter of political advantage risks relations within the 
Court as well as the Court’s standing.  Justice Field’s disappointment 
at losing out was nothing compared to the stunning episode in which 
Justice Jackson publicized Court feuds in a fury over Justice Black’s 
supposed plotting against Jackson’s aspirations to be Chief Justice.50  
Subsequent charges of presidential cronyism also helped to derail the 
promotion of Justice Fortas and tarnished the Warren Court (though 
it seems unlikely that Fortas’s political activities were intended to ad-
vance his judicial career).51  The close and continuing relationships 
many Presidents have had with their Chief Justices—including in-
stances in which Chief Justices White, Taft, Vinson, Warren, and Bur-
ger advised on political matters52—raise at least an appearance of a 
cooperative relationship beforehand as well, undermining the percep-
tion of judicial independence. 
To bar or discourage promotions, however, is a serious over-
correction if the problem stems from the need for Associate Justices to 
run the nomination and confirmation gauntlets.  Why is it, exactly, 
that a sitting Justice, imbued with life tenure on the Court, must be 
nominated and confirmed anew in order to become Chief Justice?  
Clearly, separate appointments are not unconstitutional—the uncon-
troversial promotions of Justice Cushing and Justice White look like 
proof positive.53  If Congress wishes to create a separate office of the 
Chief Justice, and to make any would-be occupant subject to confirma-
tion, it is at liberty to do so. 
48 But see Morris, supra note 47, at 35 (speculating that had Charles Evans Hughes 
declined an appointment as Associate Justice, “he probably would have been named 
Chief Justice”). 
49 Owen J. Roberts, Now Is the Time:  Fortifying the Supreme Court’s Independence, 35 
A.B.A. J. 1, 2 (1949). 
50 Howard Ball & Phillip Cooper, Fighting Justices:  Hugo L. Black and William O. 
Douglas and Supreme Court Conflict, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 26-27 (1994). 
51 See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS:  A BIOGRAPHY 337-42 (1990). 
52 Fish, supra note 5, at 131-33. 
53 See KALMAN, supra note 51, at 335; Perry, supra note 35, at 394. 
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What is less clear, however, is whether promotions need to take this 
form.  Tradition, certainly, would have it so, and deserves some defer-
ence.  But the relevant tradition is really a longstanding political prac-
tice, rather than some purer constitutional understanding, since the 
practice of separately confirming candidates for Chief Justice has been 
overdetermined.  Prior to the Taft administration—the glancing in-
stance of Cushing aside—separate confirmation was always necessary 
so that a newcomer could become a “judge” on the Supreme Court.  
Because the Judiciary Act of 1789 and successor statutes failed to dis-
tinguish between internal and external candidates for Chief Justice, it 
was inevitable that the rare nomination of a current Justice for promo-
tion would be subjected to the same process.  The question is open, 
accordingly, whether a statute might instead differentiate candidates 
for promotion and provide for their elevation by some other means—
and some of the possible mechanisms turn out to be surprisingly tra-
ditional. 
A.  A Seniority Carousel 
Presidents have always been able to choose (or avoid choosing) a 
Chief Justice based on seniority.  But could Congress instead dictate 
that the senior-most Associate Justice automatically serve as Chief?  The 
obvious risk would be promoting Justices who are past their prime, 
and unduly encouraging longer service on the Court.  Recent scholar-
ship has documented numerous instances of decrepitude on the Su-
preme Court and noted repeated proposals to amend the Constitu-
tion in order to establish a retirement age for Justices.54
Reforming the Supreme Court through a constitutional amend-
ment is not a very likely prospect, whatever its merits, but age or term 
limits for Chief Justices could be imposed without going down that 
cumbersome path—since those are not, after all, matters addressed in 
the Constitution.  One model is provided by the statute governing the 
54 See ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE:  THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 231-32 (2003) (discussing Justice Marshall’s cast-
ing of an incorrect vote and Justice Black’s confusion during oral arguments); David J. 
Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court:  The Historical Case for a 28th 
Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1086-87 (2000) (proposing, after a discussion of 
mental decrepitude, adoption of a constitutional amendment mandating retirement of 
Supreme Court Justices at age seventy-five); see also Merlo J. Pusey, The Court Copes with 
Disability, 1979 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y 63 (describing the degree to which disability 
affected the workings of particular Courts).  But see DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE 
BENCH:  SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE END (1999) (providing a slightly less pessi-
mistic account). 
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federal courts of appeals, which designates as chief judge the senior-
most judge under the age of sixty-five with at least one year of service 
and without a prior stint as chief judge—and which limits terms to 
seven years.55  Following suit for the Supreme Court would not only 
limit the age of any Associate Justice upon promotion, and limit the 
length of service as Chief, but it would also have subtler effects.  For 
example, this kind of seniority carousel may actually reduce the Jus-
tices’ mean age by establishing a natural juncture for exit:  a senior 
Associate Justice’s promotion to Chief Justice might serve as a nice way 
to “round out” a judicial career (as Associate Justice John Marshall 
Harlan once wistfully remarked),56 or at least make returning to the 
rank and file unappealing. 
Longevity effects aside, such a scheme would also diminish the 
opportunity for strategic behavior by the Justices.  Predetermining 
promotion would substantially reduce the incentives for any Justice to 
show favor to those in (or soon to be in) political power—for exam-
ple, in cases involving fundamental presidential or senatorial preroga-
tives.  It would also diminish the occasions for alleging such favoritism 
and, more generally, for the politicized examination of the Court’s 
work.  Promotions are the least attractive species of judicial appoint-
ment.  Every Associate Justice was confirmed by the Senate, of course, 
before joining the Court, so the only question is further review—review 
of a kind that is more intrusive and less deferential than would have 
been expected in 1789.  Justice Cushing was confirmed the day after 
his surprise nomination,57 and the Senate confirmed the promotions 
of Justice White and Justice Stone while honoring their submission 
that it would be inappropriate for them to testify.58  Justice Fortas, 
however was not so lucky, nor was Justice Rehnquist—although, de-
spite close scrutiny, the Fortas hearings actually failed to expose the 
55 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000); see also id. § 258 (providing for seniority-based promo-
tion of the chief judge of the Court of International Trade).  This method is not ubiq-
uitous.  See id. § 171(b) (authorizing presidential appointment of the chief judge of the 
Court of Federal Claims). 
56 Wood, supra note 46, at 32. 
57 Perry, supra note 35, at 394. 
58 KALMAN, supra note 51, at 335.  To the extent that judicial independence was 
being honored, one would expect nominees from the lower federal courts to be 
granted the same leeway, as has sometimes been the case.  See Charles M. Lamb, Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger:  A Conservative Chief for Conservative Times, in THE BURGER 
COURT:  POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 129, 132 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. 
Halpern eds., 1991) (noting that Burger’s testimony during confirmation hearings was 
short and friendly). 
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scandal that later drove him from the Court,59 and the Rehnquist 
hearings pretermitted sensitive questions regarding his previous ill 
health.60  The virtual certainty that modern sitting Justices would be 
examined on their Supreme Court records poses, at the very least, the 
risk of reducing the immunity and independence of the Court. 
Compared to the alternatives, a seniority-based system doesn’t 
look so bad.61  Its main hurdle may be a perceived inconsistency with 
the Constitution.  For one, the President would lose the right of initia-
tive, which may have certain tactical consequences.  For example, the 
Reagan administration’s experience, as noted above, supposedly 
demonstrated the wisdom of a two-nomination strategy:  that is, react-
ing to a vacancy at Chief Justice by first attempting to promote a con-
troversial (but confirmable) Associate Justice, then following with a 
more polarizing candidate for the resulting vacancy after the political 
opposition has been exhausted.62  It is doubtful, though, that such 
gambits are constitutionally protected. 
The weightier objection is that a seniority carousel would reduce 
the role of both political branches in selecting the next Chief Justice—
not only controlling the selection from among the Associate Justices, 
but also excluding the possibility of nominating someone from out-
side the Court.  That concern is substantial, but its constitutional basis 
is not unassailable.  While the strongest textual basis for a permanent, 
separately appointed office of the Chief Justice is its brief mention in 
the Impeachment Clause, a countervailing consideration is the legisla-
tive authority to regulate the meaning of the “judges” mentioned in 
Article III.  The latter authority has clear relevance here.  Conceptu-
ally, any seniority proposal effectively reconceives all appointments as 
being to the position of “Justice, eligible for succession to Chief Jus-
tice,” rather than to the position of “(non-chief) Associate Justice.”  In 
other words, Congress might decide that being Chief Justice is simply 
a potential, latent attribute of being a Justice—manifested through 
59 See KALMAN, supra note 51, at 359-76 (discussing the subsequent exposure of 
Fortas’s involvement with a financier who was under investigation by the SEC). 
60 See Garrow, supra note 54, at 1066-69 (describing the Senate’s conscious avoid-
ance of questions regarding Rehnquist’s previous use of pain medication). 
61 As Judge Feinberg once put it, evoking Churchill, “seniority is the worst way to 
select a chief judge, except for all the other ways.”  Wilfred Feinberg, The Office of Chief 
Judge of a Federal Court of Appeals, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 373 (1984). 
62 See Joan A. Lukey, Op-Ed., Beyond Rock, Paper, Scissors:  Choosing a New Chief Justice 
Is a Complex Game, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, at M1 (noting Reagan’s “packaging” strat-
egy, and suggesting that President George W. Bush could employ it to better effect). 
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details to the position of Chief Justice63—rather than a discrete office 
requiring political supervision on a piecework basis. 
The idea is not as radical as it may sound.  As presently structured, 
the Chief Justice looks like an “officer” of a kind requiring appoint-
ment pursuant to Article II.64  But case law holds that those already 
commissioned as officers per the Appointments Clause do not neces-
sarily require a separate appointment in order to assume additional 
duties, thus redeeming the statutory assignment of military officers to 
be military judges65 or members of a commission on public park-
land.66  Such transfers are permitted so long as those duties are ger-
mane to the original office67 (which is plainly true for movement 
within the Court) and so long as Congress is not “trying to both create 
an office and also select a particular individual to fill the office”68 (and 
the premise of a seniority carousel, of course, is that political control 
of Chief-designation is, if anything, diminished).69  The Court’s deci-
sion upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission, 
and its recognition that Congress may subject Article III judges to an 
additional appointments process before giving them new responsibili-
ties, does not suggest that it must do so, and the Court cited instances 
in which such responsibilities had been assigned without any such 
hurdle.70  Indeed, the Court cited the Chief Justice’s own ex officio du-
ties,71 which are an embarrassment to any appointments objection to a 
seniority carousel; some of these assignments, like the Chief Justice’s 
inclusion in the Sinking Fund Commission established in 1806, are 
deeply rooted in the constitutional tradition and were not regarded as 
63 Cf. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1994) (citing examples in which 
military officers are detailed to separate, statutorily created positions without the re-
quirement of a separate appointment). 
64 See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) (indicating that when a 
judicial office is “‘established by Law,’ and the duties, salary, and means of appoint-
ment for that office are specified by statute,” individuals occupying that position are 
likely to be viewed, at a minimum, as “inferior Office[rs]” subject to Article II confir-
mation) (citation omitted). 
65 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 169-76. 
66 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300-01 (1893). 
67 Id. at 301. 
68 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 174. 
69 None of this is to say, of course, that Congress could not choose to require a 
second appointment process, as it has for example with the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.  Id. at 171. 
70 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398-401 (1989). 
71 Id. at 400 n.24. 
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raising Appointments Clause problems.72  Any constitutional infirmity 
would also call into question the statute designating chief judges for 
the courts of appeals, which must be premised on the distinction be-
tween the tenure of a federal judge and the tenure of her stint as chief 
judge. 
One might nevertheless insist that the express constitutional men-
tion of the Chief Justice (and not, say, the chief judge of the D.C. Cir-
cuit) makes all the difference.  This could be resolved by retaining a 
“Chief Justice,” selected as at present, to do the only thing mentioned 
in the Constitution—preside over impeachment of the President—
and creating a different officer (say, the “Principal Justice”), selected 
on seniority, to discharge all the other responsibilities presently as-
signed to the Chief.  Even doing that would do more than the Im-
peachment Clause requires.  It seems unlikely that the Framers desig-
nated the Chief Justice in order to avoid having other members of the 
Supreme Court preside; the idea, presumably, was to designate some 
member of the brethren to serve in lieu of the Vice President, who 
otherwise might affect whether he would succeed to the Presidency.73  
(If anything, the Clause’s general theme—to reduce the role of execu-
tive branch politics in the impeachment process—would favor em-
ploying a Justice selected with the least amount of presidential inter-
vention.)  Finally, if the Impeachment Clause means that only a 
person confirmed as Chief Justice will do, it would condemn the exist-
ing law that allows the senior Associate Justice to serve if and to the ex-
tent that the Chief Justice becomes disabled.74  Whatever the merits of 
the present scheme, and however steeped in tradition it may be, it is 
difficult to defend as a constitutional necessity. 
B.  A College of Cardinals 
Once liberated from the confirmation process, the position of 
Chief Justice might be filled from among the sitting Justices in a num-
72 See Wheeler, supra note 23, at 139-44 (discussing the Chief Justice’s early service 
on the Sinking Fund Commission); 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 929 (1852) (statement of 
Rep. Randolph) (suggesting that Commissioners on the Sinking Fund Commission 
“are not, strictly speaking, officers,” since “[t]he duties they discharge are ex officio . . . 
and, as Commissioners, they receive no salary”). 
73 Letter from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase to the Senate of the United States 
(Mar. 4, 1868), in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, at 256. 
74 28 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) (“Whenever the Chief Justice is unable to perform the du-
ties of his office or the office is vacant, his powers and duties shall devolve upon the 
associate justice next in precedence who is able to act . . . .”). 
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ber of ways, not just by seniority.  For example, a statute could provide 
that the Justices themselves could elect their Chief, not unlike the way 
the College of Cardinals chooses the Pope (though the Pope, it turns 
out, need not have been a Cardinal).75
Like the seniority carousel, such an approach has legal antece-
dents.  The State of Florida, for example, lets a majority of its justices 
decide on the chief justice—by tradition, for a two-year term.76  The 
consistency with the U.S. Constitution is certainly less clear, but still 
compelling.  Under Article II, Section 2, Congress is free to “vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper” in, 
among others, “the Courts of Law.”77  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
has held that the chief judge of the U.S. Tax Court—acting as one of 
those “Courts of Law” despite its non-Article III status—may be statu-
torily assigned the power to appoint special trial judges who exercise 
substantial discretion, including the power to decide certain cases and 
to propose findings in others.78  By comparison, vesting an entire Arti-
cle III court with the power to select a Chief Justice from among the 
Justices seems unexceptionable, at least so long as the statute deline-
ates the duties of a Chief Justice additional to those powers already 
possessed by virtue of prior appointment. 
A College of Cardinals system would also recognize the degree to 
which the Court is already self-regulating.  The practice of letting the 
Chief Justice assign opinions, for example, is a substantial power, but 
exceeding its traditional bounds risks a fierce backlash, at least by the 
Court’s mavericks.79  This self-regulation has, in fact, sometimes 
touched on questions of tenure.  Justices have advised their elderly 
75 Interestingly, John Paul II regarded it as “an indisputable principle that the 
Roman Pontiff has the right to define and adapt to changing times the manner of des-
ignating the person called to assume the Petrine succession in the Roman See.”  John 
Paul II, Apostolic Constitution, Universi Dominici Gregis (Feb. 22, 1996), pmbl., available 
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_constitutions/ (follow “Uni-
versi Dominici Gregis” hyperlink).  So why not the Chief Justice? 
76 REV. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2; FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.030(a)(2)(A); see also Joseph 
A. Boyd, Jr. & Randall Reder, A History of the Florida Supreme Court, 35 U. MIA. L. REV. 
1019, 1051 (1981) (explaining the Florida rule). 
77 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
78 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 870-71, 888-91 (1991). 
79 Justice Douglas, for example, objected vigorously when he perceived that Chief 
Justice Burger was usurping the right of the senior Associate Justice in the majority to 
make the opinion assignment in cases in which the Chief Justice was dissenting.  
Wood, supra note 46, at 29.  Justice McReynolds, in an earlier episode, supposedly told 
a messenger sent by Chief Justice Hughes, “Tell the Chief Justice that I don’t work for 
him.”  STEAMER, supra note 12, at 21. 
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colleagues that they are too old to continue serving,80 or even con-
spired to deprive them of their full authority—usually by limiting 
opinion-writing assignments.81  (The colleagues of Justice McKenna 
and Justice Douglas, however, went so far as to decide that neither of 
them should cast deciding votes.)82  Sitting and departing Justices 
have also advised Presidents regarding the best choice for a successor 
Chief Justice.83
Making the Justices responsible for electing a Chief Justice would 
be somewhat more transparent.  It is also more facile.  As then-Justice 
Rehnquist admitted, judges have a tendency toward “pulling the wag-
ons around” when it comes to matters of their health and compe-
tence.84  This reticence mainly marks their willingness to disclose their 
infirmities to the outside world, but it also tends to make them tardy 
in confronting colleagues with the need to retire.85  No Justice, more-
over, needs to accept such advice.86  Allowing the Justices to deter-
mine their leader makes intervening on the basis of age and health 
easier:  not only is demotion a less bitter pill than resignation, but the 
Justices’ action can be decisive rather than merely advisory.  Judges 
have long recognized, in principle, the possibility of decrepitude—
Charles Evans Hughes, between spells on the Court, urged a manda-
tory retirement policy, and Judge Richard Posner, limited to a term as 
chief judge, described the judiciary as “the nation’s premier geriatric 
80 This occurred, for example, with Justices Grier, Field, McKenna, and Holmes.  
Garrow, supra note 54, at 1004, 1009, 1015-16, 1018. 
81 WARD, supra note 54, at 116-19, 186-89; Garrow, supra note 54, at 1015-16, 1054-
56. 
82 WARD, supra note 54, at 118, 187-88; Garrow, supra note 54, at 1015, 1053.  Ward 
and Garrow also report that Justice Rutledge (and possibly Justice Black) cast votes on 
behalf of an ailing Justice Murphy.  WARD, supra note 54, at 148; Garrow, supra note 54, 
at 1027. 
83 See WARD, supra note 54, at 170 (revealing Warren’s apparent intent to recom-
mend a successor); Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 6 n.10, 8 (1967) (noting consultations prior to the nominations of Hughes and 
Stone); McHargue, supra note 44, at 492 (noting consultations between Taft and the 
entire Court prior to the nomination of Justice White); Morris, supra note 47, at 34 
(describing advice presented by Justice Harlan to President Taft). 
84 Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 206 (1986). 
85 Garrow’s article, supra note 54, is essentially a criticism of prior opinion that the 
practice of collegial intervention was sufficient. 
86 According to one well-known anecdote, Justice Harlan was sent to ask an aging 
Justice Field if he recalled his own intercession with Justice Grier some years before.  
Justice Field replied, “Yes!  And a dirtier day’s work I never did in my life!”  CHARLES 
EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  ITS FOUNDATION, 
METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS:  AN INTERPRETATION 76 (1928). 
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occupation”87—and might be given better tools for self-help before 
any clumsier limits on judicial terms are hazarded. 
CONCLUSION 
Needless to say, upsetting the scheme for selecting Chief Justices 
after over 200 years is no mean feat, and less ambitious changes may 
be preferable.  One compromise would be to combine a promotion 
mechanism with more traditional avenues for appointment.  A statute 
might provide, for example, that the President may nominate any 
candidate for Chief Justice, but that if she does not—or if no candi-
date is confirmed—another promotion mechanism would kick in 
(yielding, for example, the promotion of the senior-most Associate 
Justice for a term of years).  Better still, the statute might defer to a 
statutory promotion mechanism unless and until the President over-
rode that Chief Justice with a separately nominated candidate, having 
convinced the Senate that the new candidate was superior to the in-
cumbent.  Either method seems hard to criticize, particularly since ex-
isting law provides that the senior Associate Justice may serve in lieu of 
the Chief Justice, without even the safeguard of a limited term.88  Ei-
ther would also allow nomination of a newcomer as Chief Justice, 
which may be a necessary option to preserve for coping with an aging 
or dysfunctional court.  Of course, if the political branches genuinely 
feared losing control of the Court, they could always compensate by 
diminishing the Chief Justice’s statutory responsibilities. 
In any event, having recently filled the position of Chief Justice—
thus enabling a more dispassionate examination of the office, rather 
than of a particular nominee or nominator—the time is propitious for 
reconsidering it.  Chief Justice Rehnquist recently presided over only 
the second impeachment of a President, receiving good marks.  It is 
easy to see how only good fortune prevented the trial from being 
marred by allegations of favoritism—imagine the protests if President 
Clinton’s successful defense had been presided over by a Clinton-
selected Chief Justice, or if Chief Justice Rehnquist had taken debat-
able positions that resulted in Clinton’s removal.  Recent debates over 
the filibuster have shown the persistence of ideological rifts over judi-
87 Garrow, supra note 54, at 997 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD 
AGE 180 (1995)). 
88 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  For an account of some instances in 
which this has happened, none appearing to have exceeded six months, see Wood, 
supra note 46, at 26-29. 
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cial appointments, boding ill for future nominations to the Supreme 
Court.  If we desire constructive, rather than destructive, political dia-
logue over the choice of a Chief Justice, it is better to consider the is-
sue systematically, including consideration of the proper method for 
choosing, and not just the individuals as they arise. 
